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INTRODUCTION
When someone builds on another’s land, the rules of accession, specifically
those of inaedificatio, determine the reallocation of rights in the materials
used in building. That is, the owner of the immovable property, the
principal, acquires ownership of the building because, by operation of law, it
accedes to the land. A court’s role is to confirm or deny the occurrence of
accession. In principle, whether accession occurs is judged objectively in the
light of a set of criteria concerned with the relationship between the building
works and the land, rather than that between the builder and his materials or
that between the landowner and the builder.1 This mode of original
acquisition of ownership, therefore, operates as a primary mechanism for the
reallocation of rights in movable things that are incorporated into land, an
immovable. However, when only part of the building is on the land of the
other, then it seems that the rules of encroachment apply to exclude the
consequence of accession. The builder thus retains ownership of the
materials used in the building works notwithstanding that they have been
incorporated into the soil belonging to the neighbour.2 As South African case
law has developed, the extent of encroachment does not appear to influence
the matter. The court seems able to override the neighbour’s right to demand
removal of the building works — which right is an entitlement of ownership
flowing from the right to uninterrupted possession — in the exercise of its
* LDipLib (Stellenbosch) BA LLB (Rhodes) PG Dip International Research
Ethics (Cape Town). Sincere thanks to colleagues and the anonymous referee for
their most helpful comments.
1 See D L Carey Miller & Anne Pope ‘Acquisition of ownership’ in Reinhard
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in
Comparative Perspective (2004) 681.
2 In what follows, the words ‘builder’ and ‘neighbour’ are be used to distinguish
the two landowners. ‘Builder’ refers to the person building on the other’s land;
‘neighbour’ refers to the owner of the land built upon.
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discretion to award compensation instead. But how does the court decide
that the building dispute before it is an encroachment rather than an instance
of accession?
Clearly, more than one set of principles apply to the situation where one
person builds on another’s land. Deciding which principles take precedence
in a given situation should be based on clear reasoning that reflects adherence
to the structure of property law so that certainty and reasonable, practical
outcomes are achieved. The extent of encroachment would be significant in
guiding the court to make the determination of the choice of rules, as a
preliminary matter. Where policy dictates a solution contrary to a structured
approach, the reasons for such variation must be compelling and accord with
the constitutional requirements for protection of property rights.
The established approach in South African courts seems to regard every
instance of building partly on a neighbour’s land as an encroachment.
Consideration is given only to whether removal of the building works
should be ordered or compensation awarded to the neighbour. This
approach does not give due consideration to the rights of the neighbour and
arguably results in an arbitrary deprivation of the neighbour’s property in
terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution.3 This is particularly the case when the
encroachment is very extensive, as in the case under consideration here. This
article contends that, in order to comply with its constitutional obligations4
to develop the common law in light of the values enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, a court must adopt a nuanced approach to situations involving
building on another’s land so as to give proper attention to the rights of both
parties and thus to prevent the possibility of unfair deprivation. That the
parties themselves have not questioned the status quo is of no significance:
‘The courts must remain vigilant and should not hesitate to ensure that the
common law is developed to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights. . .[T]his duty upon judges arises. . .whether or not the parties in any
particular case request the court to develop the common law under s 39(2).’5
I argue below that the extent of encroachment must guide the court in its
decision to regard the interference with possession as an encroachment
rather than an instance of accession so as to maintain the integrity of the
principle-based structure of property law. In essence, the ambit of the rules of
encroachment should be restricted to situations where the extent of
encroachment is minor or trivial, ie insignificant. Furthermore, in the
determination of whether and how the builder should be compensated, a
failure in the case law to separate clearly unjustified enrichment issues from
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
4 The courts have the inherent power to develop the common law (s 173 of the
Constitution) and must do so with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights (s 39(2) of the Constitution); see also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and
Security (henceforth Carmichele) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 34; K v Minister of Safety
and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) paras 16–17.
5 Carmichele supra note 4 para 36.
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interferences with proprietary rights has blurred the distinctions in situations
where building over the boundary line has taken place, resulting in the
potential for an arbitrary deprivation of the neighbour’s property. To frame
the issues, I begin by analysing a recent case. Within the constitutional
context, I then proceed to examine the context of ownership principles in
which accession operates, as well as the established exceptions to the ex lege
outcome of accession, the nature of encroachment, and the law’s treatment
of interferences with invasions of possession. The last part deals with whether
reallocation of rights or compensation for the neighbour is the appropriate
remedy in particular situations. Specifically, I propose that, in order to
maintain the integrity of the principle-based structure of property law, the
extent of encroachment must guide the court in its decision to regard the
interference with possession as an encroachment rather than an instance of
accession. Secondly, if encroachment rules apply, then the extent of
encroachment informs the decision whether to support the neighbour’s
demand for removal. Thirdly, if the decision is to compensate the neighbour,
then the extent of encroachment informs the determination of the measure
of compensation to be awarded, in light of the requirements of s 25(3) of the
Constitution.6 Necessarily, therefore, the extent of encroachment is integral
to a constitutionally sound consideration of the situation where building
occurs partly on another’s land.
THE FACTS OF TRUSTEES, BRIAN LACKEY TRUST v ANNAN-
DALE7
The facts of this case are simple if startling: the Trust began building a large
luxury house that was meant to straddle the boundary between the two
(consolidated) erven it owned. Instead, building took place over the
boundary between the erven owned by the trust and that owned by a
neighbour, Stanley Annandale. By the time the error was discovered, the
house was some nine weeks from completion and the result was an
‘inadvertently erected’ encroachment, according to the court, of proportions
that boggle the mind. Fully eighty per cent of neighbour Annandale’s land
was occupied by the house.8 The parties being unwilling to resolve the
matter amicably, the builder sought a declaratory order: it wanted an
assurance that demolition was not inevitable; the neighbour countered,
insisting on his right to demand demolition. The court found that it had
discretion to award compensation and thus declared that the neighbour was
‘not entitled to the removal. . .of the encroachment’.9
6 This subsection sets out the considerations when determining ‘the amount of
compensation and the time and manner of payment’.
7 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) (hereafter Brian Lackey Trust).
8 Ibid para 4.
9 Ibid para 45.
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Several issues arising from these facts merit comment, but only the final
point is elaborated upon:
(1) When the error of building was discovered, the builder offered to
purchase the land, which offer was rejected by the neighbour, who
demanded a higher purchase price, failing which, removal of the
encroachment. The latter demand amounts to an assertion of the
owner’s right to uninterrupted possession, an incident of ownership.
Surprisingly, this demand for removal was rejected by the builder,
apparently without a legal basis. One wonders why the neighbour’s
legal representative did not seek a declaratory order at this point in the
process. At best, this builder has the right to seek compensation for
unjustified enrichment, ie compensation for the materials and labour
expended in building on the neighbour’s land. This right cannot
without more override the neighbour’s entitlement flowing from the
real right of ownership.
(2) The judgment frames the issues as
‘whether or not a ‘‘massive encroachment’’, inadvertently erected by the
plaintiffs on land belonging to defendant, ought to be demolished. This
issue, in turn, depends on whether or not the court has a discretion to permit
the plaintiffs to retain the structure — and effectively acquire the defendant’s
land in the process — against payment of compensation to the defendant’.
With respect, whether demolition ought to occur is to be determined
on the merits of the matter, while the existence of a discretion is a
matter of law to be determined as a preliminary step. In the situation
before the court, the issue was whether the court had discretion to
override the owner’s right to uninterrupted possession (and hence the
right to demand removal of an encroachment). The issue ought to have
been framed, therefore, as whether, on the facts of the case, the right to
removal must be supported.
(3) An unusual aspect of the case is that the plaintiff is the builder. Most of
the reported cases involve the neighbour seeking redress. In this
instance, the builder requested a declaratory order to the effect that the
neighbour was entitled not to removal but to payment of compensation
by the builder. In other words, the builder claimed that his right to
compensation on the basis of unjustifed enrichment should override the
neighbour’s right to repel interference with possession. In effect, the
builder was insisting that the court should sanction a forced sale of the
encroached-upon land. What is the legal basis for this? The builder
commits a wrong, albeit inadvertently, by interfering with the
possession of the neighbour and consequently demands acquisition of
ownership of the land. This amounts to a demand for expropriation.
Arguably, this is not a good cause of action and defendant ought to have
challenged it by way of exception. The builder is free to request a
declaration of rights, but is not entitled, at any price, to demand the land
of another, even if he has built thereon. The neighbour, on the other
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hand, being the owner of the land, is entitled to demand removal of the
encroachment. The court’s role is to determine whether, on the facts,
this entitlement should be supported.
(4) Nowhere in the judgment is the issue of accession raised. Seemingly
without question, the matter is dealt with as one of encroachment. The
builder intended to build on his own land, but made a mistake as to the
identity of the erven upon which building actually took place. No
dispute is possible about whether the movables have been incorporated
into the land. But who owns the land? Why does the builder ‘retain’
ownership in the building that has patently acceded to the land
belonging to the neighbour? What exactly is an encroachment? The
finding that he who builds on eighty per cent of his neighbour’s land,
nevertheless owns the building (and can claim the land) is counterintui-
tive and seems to result in an arbitrary deprivation of the neighbour’s
property. Logically and in accordance with principle, the neighbour
ought to own the building on his land through accession. This result
would accord with an objective assessment of the factual situation. In
circumstances where encroachment is not extensive, it may make sense,
for policy reasons, to resolve the dispute by reallocating the rights in the
encroached-upon land through exercise of the court’s discretion, rather
than by confirming the (automatic) reallocation of rights in the
(previously movable) materials used in the building works by accession.
However, policy cannot be permitted to violate the protection of
property rights guaranteed by the Constitution without justification,
which means that compelling reasons must exist for the neighbour’s
entitlement to demand removal to be overridden in favour of the
builder.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The property clause in the Constitution prohibits deprivation of property
unless in terms of a law of general application, which may not permit
arbitrary deprivation.10 The meaning of ‘arbitrary’ was explored recently by
the Constitutional Court,11 which concluded that ‘arbitrary’ in terms of
s 25(1) means that ‘the law does not provide sufficient reason for the
particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair’.12 Whether
‘sufficient reason’ exists is to be determined on the basis of an evaluation of
10 Section 25 of the Constitution.
11 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768
(CC) (hereafter Wesbank).
12 Ibid para 100. The court outlines the steps according to which ‘sufficient
reason’ is to be determined:
‘(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means
employed, namely the deprivation in question and ends sought to be
achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question.
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered.
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the complexity of relationships involved, including the purpose of the
deprivation, the effect on the person whose property is affected, and whether
all the incidents of ownership are affected by the deprivation, in which case
the purpose of deprivation must be more compelling. While the Constitu-
tional Court dealt with provisions of customs and excise legislation rather
than common law principles, doubtless the approach would be similar in the
latter instance. Since the property in the case under discussion is land and all
the incidents of ownership are involved, in accordance with Wesbank, only a
compelling purpose qualifies as sufficient reason for the deprivation. The
issue here, therefore, is whether a sufficient reason exists for overriding the
outcome of accession, the primary mechanism for reallocation of rights in
situations like the present, viz where building work has taken place, in favour
of the residual mechanism for resolution of disputes concerning building
over the boundary line. This requires careful analysis of the context of
ownership principles in which accession operates, as well as of the established
exceptions to accession, the nature of encroachment, and the law’s treatment
of invasions of possession. Only then is it possible to consider adequately
whether, in light of constitutional principles, compensation is the appropri-
ate remedy or whether application of encroachment principles should be
considered. These are the topics of the next sections.
THE CONTEXT OF ACCESSION
The modern civilian ownership right knows only one form, ie a thing is
either owned or not. There are no stages or degrees of ownership except
where statutory provisions stipulate otherwise.13 Where a change of
ownership is at issue, therefore, one looks for a single act or event as the
actuating factor.14 The rules governing acquisition of ownership deal with a
fundamental tension of property law, viz that between intention (represent-
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship between the
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected.
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and
the nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation in respect of such property.
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a corporeal
movable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law
to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than in the case when the property is
something different and the property right something less extensive. This judgment is not
concerned at all with incorporeal property.
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of ownership,
the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling that when the deprivation
embraces only some incidents ownership and those incidents only partially.
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the property in
question and the extent of its deprivation, there may be circumstances when sufficient reason is
established by, in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in
others this might only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by
s 36(1) of the Constitution.
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to be decided on all the
relevant facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind that the enquiry is concerned with
‘‘arbitrary’’ in relation to the deprivation of property under s 25.’
13 For example, the land reform concept ‘initial ownership’ in terms of the
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995.
14 Carey Miller & Pope op cit note 1 at 674.
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ing the interests of the parties concerned) and publicity (serving the interests
of third parties). In managing this tension, the rules must balance the interests
of the various parties so as to limit the effect of intention and to ensure
sufficient publicity.15 Property law is structured and principle-driven in
order to provide certainty, especially about land issues. Sometimes, however,
decisions that appear to be driven by socio-economic policy can complicate
matters.
The hallmark of original acquisition of ownership is that, by operation of
law, the presence of specific, objectively determined, factors results in a
reallocation of rights, providing a stark exception to the norm that
ownership is not lost involuntarily.16 Different modes of original acquisition
of ownership supply rules that confirm or deny the reallocation of rights in
particular circumstances. In each case, possession and intention, amongst
others, are factors that determine reallocation. Original acquisition of
ownership is associated with a definite point in time, an act or an event,
judged objectively, on the basis of which a change of ownership occurs. In
this respect similarity exists between original and derivative acquisition of
ownership, the latter’s definite point requiring simultaneous co-existence of
a real agreement and delivery to signal the transfer of ownership.
In the case of joined or mixed things, necessarily the nature of the join or
mixing identifies which rules apply to the particular factual circumstances.
Thus, where one thing is joined to another so that the former loses its
identity to the latter through becoming part of the latter, then the rules of
accession apply. The owner of the principal thing — land as immovable
property is always the principal — acquires ownership of the attached things,
apparently on a primary basis. That is, in the absence of circumstances where
an exception applies,17 an agreement between the parties cannot prevent
accession if the objective appearance indicates its occurrence. In other
circumstances, reallocation of rights depends on the separability of the
mixture and on whether the mixed things retain their identity, according to
the rules of confusion/commixtion, but on a residual basis. In other words,
where no agreement to the contrary exists, the rules of confusion/
commixtion apply. In the case of accession, however, the existence of an
agreement cannot change what is obvious to the observer: the incorporation
15 Ibid.
16 Indeed, the strength of this norm is such that the distinction between original
and derivative acquisition of ownership is frequently glossed over, as is revealed in
the oft-quoted dictum by Innes CJ in MacDonald v Radin NO and the Potchefstroom
Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 467 (henceforth MacDonald), which dealt
with inaedificatio: ‘[T]he fundamental principle [is] that . . . dominium cannot be
transferred or altered, save by the intent of the dominus’. L P W van Vliet ‘Accession
of movables to land’ (2002) 6 Edinburgh LR 67–84 and 199–216 argues most cogently
that a misinterpretation of Roman-Dutch texts has led to the inference that the
intention of the owner of the movable turns it into an immovable.
17 See below.
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of one or more things into another, unless policy reasons dictate otherwise.
In light of Wesbank, such reasons would have to be compelling.
A further tension in this area of law is that between principle and policy.
How is it determined whether structure and dogma (principle) should
prevail over solutions sought for particular fact categories (policy)? The
interplay between principle and policy is well illustrated in the difficulties
that accompany the determination of reallocation of rights in property. The
principles that underlie reallocation of rights in the case of inaedificatio are
publicity,18 given effect to by an objective assessment of the reasonable
expectation of an outsider, and protection of ownership. Neither principle is
given precedence on a consistent basis, which means that, sometimes, policy
choices determine that principle should not apply, or should be interpreted
in a particular way, in the public interest. For example, a policy position that
‘supports preservation of value would leave the composite thing whole
rather than reduce it to its constituent parts’.19 Similarly, policy might
discourage disproportionate prejudice to one neighbour, thus requiring
principle to give way to policy. In the context under consideration, arguably,
this rationale would underpin the application of encroachment rules where
the extent of building over the boundary line is trivial or insignificant.
Policy by its nature is flexible, so that individual cases can be treated on
their own merits. But when policy is so flexible as to obscure the presence of
principle, the law becomes uncertain and confusing. It is important for the
courts to clarify the law because of their constitutional obligation to develop
the common law and to realize the constitutional rights of all. Interpretation
of the factors20 applicable to inaedificatio has been inconsistent in South
African law. The cases demonstrate that intention is weighted differently in
different factual circumstances,21 apparently for policy reasons, but some-
times in defiance of principle.22 The line between original and derivative
acquisition of ownership may be fine, but it is important because each
operates on a fundamentally different basis. The former occurs mechanically
18 Van Vliet op cit note 16 at 69–70.
19 Carey Miller & Pope op cit note 1 at 678; Van Vliet op cit note 16 at 69 and
199.
20 Outlined in Olivier v Haarhof & Co 1906 TS 497 as the nature and purpose of the
movable, the degree and manner of its annexation, and the intention of the owner of
the movable with regard to its attachment.
21 MacDonald supra note 16, Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund
(Transvaal) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) (henceforth Melcorp), Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd v
Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) (henceforth Theatre Investments) and Konstanz
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) (henceforth
Konstanz Properties); Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999
(2) SA 986 (T) (henceforth Unimark).
22 See Melcorp supra note 21 (lift in a high-rise building held to be movable);
Simmer & Jack Mines Ltd v GF Industrial Property Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 654 (W)
(mine dump held to be movable); see also Van Vliet op cit note 16 at 205–9.
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in the presence of objectively determined factors, while the latter requires
active involvement of the parties concerned.
EXCEPTIONS
Although in principle inaedificatio concerns the relationship between land
and building works, the identity of the builder is relevant sometimes for the
purpose of a practical resolution to a particular problem in so far as the
automatic reallocation of rights in the attached movable property is
concerned. In such a case, the mechanism must be seen as residual rather than
primary.
Thus, a usufructuary has no claim for improvements, but may remove
ornamental additions. By implication, the improvements accede to the
principal. By inference, the dominant owner would have a similar right of
removal, were he to have built on the servient tenement in the course of
exercising servitudinal rights.23
When the builder is a tenant, the outcome of accession may be suspended
until termination of the lease. Thus, perhaps unremarkably, the tenant may
build, within limits as recorded in the lease agreement, and may remove that
which was built on termination of the lease.24 More interesting is the
situation where the tenant builds without the landlord’s consent and is thus
in a position similar to that of a mala fide possessor. The tenant may separate
or break down the structures and remove the materials, but has no claim for
compensation. This right to removal may derive from the ius tollendi,
granted to all possessors, which serves to postpone accession in order to
prevent unjustified enrichment of the landlord.25
A further exception applies in the case of a bona fide possessor, who has a
right of retention until such time as compensation for the improvement to
the property of the true owner is paid.26 This right is not personal, but rather
sui generis in nature. The maxim
23 C G van der Merwe & M J de Waal The Law of Things and Servitudes (1993) para
260.
24 De Beers Consolidated Mines v London & South African Exploration Co 10 SC 359 at
370.
25 As authorized by the 1658 Placaet of the States of Holland re-enacted in 1698.
The nature of the right of removal is probably real (cf the right of superficies in
German, Swiss and French law discussed by Van Vliet op cit note 16 at 70) but is
dependent on the personal right in terms of the lease. It should be noted that the
Placaet applies only to rural leases: see Business Aviation Corporation v Rand Airport
Holdings 2006 (6) SA 605 (SCA) at 612. Nevertheless, in the matter under
consideration here, this finding has no effect because the common law provides a
similar right derived from the general ius tollendi.
26 See United Building Society v Smookler’s Trustees and Golombick’s Trustee 1906 TS
623 (henceforth UBS v Smookler’s Trustees); J G Lotz (updated by F D J Brand)
‘Enrichment’ in W A Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 9 2 ed (1996)
para 231.
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‘no man may enrich himself at the cost of another, [modifies], to the extent to
which it applies, the still more ancient maxim that whatever is affixed to the soil
passes with the soil, and similarly that whatever is inextricably mingled with a
chattel becomes part of that chattel’.27
It seems, however, that a mala fide possessor does not have such a right of
retention.28 This accords with the position in later Roman law.29
What these exceptions indicate is a practical approach to a structured
principle-dependent framework that governs building on land owned by
another. That no exception exists for a mala fide possessor provides support
for the view that structure must be regarded as important. Ownership, the
most complete real right, is a fundamental value in South African society —
as the protection provided in the Constitution indicates — which means that
it should be protected in principle from unwarranted interference by others.
Thus the exceptions created for tenants and bona fide possessors protect
ownership: in the case of the tenant builder, his ownership in the movable
goods is preserved despite attachment to the land, unless the tenant chooses
not to remove them at the termination of the lease or neglects to do so
within a reasonable time, in which case the outcome is automatic acquisition
of ownership for the landowner. That is, the contract-dependent personal
right ceases to exist at a particular time, specified in the lease; the ‘infinite’
real right of the landowner, in abeyance for the duration of the lease, revives
upon its termination. Here one can see policy taking precedence over
principle for practical reasons. A tenant needs to be able to make changes to
suit the purpose of the lease, but then the landowner’s otherwise automatic
acquisition of ownership of attached things must be controlled and regulated
for the sake of fairness and practicality.
The bona fide possessor builder, on the other hand, loses ownership in the
attached movables — principle takes precedence — but he is entitled to fair
compensation on the basis of a claim for unjustified enrichment. He is
treated sympathetically in so far as the changes to the land would have been
made innocently. It is thus easy to understand why no exception exists for a
mala fide possessor. There is no obvious reason to treat sympathetically
someone who deliberately interferes with another’s possession of land to the
extent that he builds thereon. But what of the situation where the builder
builds over the boundary line, whether negligently or deliberately, but does
not build wholly on the land of the neighbour?
ENCROACHMENT
According to Milton,30 the term ‘encroachment’ is both a descriptive device
as well as a ‘term of art’. The term describes situations where airspace over
27 UBS v Smookler’s Trustees supra note 26 at 627.
28 Ibid at 633.
29 See below.
30 J R L Milton ‘The law of neighbours in South Africa’ 1969 Acta Juridica 123 at
234.
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the neighbour’s land is invaded by objects originating on the builder’s land
and where the boundary line between the two properties is overreached
‘usually only for a matter of a few inches or feet’. As a term of art,
encroachment indicates ‘the situation where a building is erected wholly or
substantially on a neighbour’s land’. Both sets of circumstances give rise to an
action for the neighbour.31
Modern South African textbooks,32 however, deal with encroachment in
a somewhat cryptic fashion, stating merely that one must be careful to build
only on one’s own land. In the event that one is not careful, then various
possible solutions are outlined. The cases indicate that sometimes demolition
is ordered; sometimes the encroacher keeps the building and acquires the
land as well.33 Interestingly, the latter solution seems not to stem from
exercise of the court’s discretion but rather is dependent upon the
neighbour’s willingness not ‘to press his strict rights to their fullest’ and to
transfer the land to the builder instead. This important distinction is not
always acknowledged in texts or later case law. The implication of the
distinction must be that, if the neighbour is unwilling to divest himself of
ownership, then, whether the court has power to in effect order a forced sale
requires analysis and justification in light of the principles governing
expropriation. It is thus misleading to include transfer of the neighbour’s land
as a possible solution without indicating the important rider, namely that the
neighbour’s willingness to co-operate is essential. In effect, for this solution
to stand up to scrutiny, the transaction has to be one involving derivative
acquisition of ownership, for which the transferor’s co-operation is required,
ie the transaction is bilateral. The current rendition in the textbooks and the
later cases implies that the court’s power is to effect an original mode of
acquisition of ownership by ordering transfer against the will of the
neighbour, ie a unilateral transaction.
There does not appear to be any principled framework that forms the basis
for deciding whether encroachment rules are applicable or not. Nor is the
extent of encroachment discussed as a possible trigger for use of the rules.
Although the court in this instance concedes that the cases discussed by
Milton were concerned with ‘less substantial encroachments, none of which
entailed a complete deprivation of the innocent owner’s property’,34 it goes
31 On the basis that the entitlement to uninterrupted possession has been violated.
The position in English law was different because the English concept of trespass,
which provided the remedy for such situations, differs fundamentally from the South
African concept; see Milton op cit note 30 at 234.
32 See eg P J Badenhorst, Juanita M Pienaar & Hanri Mostert Silberberg and
Schoeman’s Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 121–5; C G van der Merwe ‘Things’ in
W A Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 27 First Reissue (2002) para
317; Van der Merwe & De Waal op cit note 23 para 126; C G van der Merwe Sakereg
2 ed (1989) 202.
33 See Christie v Haarhof (1886) 4 HCG 349 and Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC
360, cited in Milton op cit note 30 at 243.
34 Brian Lackey Trust supra note 7 para 21.
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on to state ‘[i]t is equally true . . . that none of those cases decided that the
court’s discretion, as a matter of law, is not available in cases of more serious
encroachment’.35 No textbook addresses the issue of precisely when
encroachment rules are triggered or how one should deal with the clear
overlap between inaedificatio and encroachment. One instance of building
on or just over a boundary line, usually to construct a wall between
neighbours (known as a party wall), may provide some insight.
The consequence of building a wall on the boundary between two erven
is that each adjacent owner automatically acquires a fifty per cent interest in
the wall. By operation of law, the rights in the wall are reallocated, whether
building on or over the boundary line occurred intentionally or inadvert-
ently. Henceforth, the relationship between the neighbours is governed by
the rights and duties as set out in so-called party-wall rules. In this instance,
then, the interplay between publicity and protection of ownership results in
a consequence that achieves recognition of both principles: from the
observer’s point of view (publicity), the factual situation accords with the
legal position in so far as the position of the wall and the allocation of
ownership rights are concerned. Neither owner suffers a deprivation of
ownership but rather each is put to terms, as it were, for the purpose of how
they must conduct themselves in future regarding the wall. They share
responsibility for its upkeep and may not act unilaterally to alter it. Rather
than treating it as an encroachment (and thus subject to the neighbour’s right
to demand removal), the law chooses to make the neighbours deal with each
other about the wall, probably for practical reasons. A modern application of
the law’s practical attitude towards neighbours is to be seen in sectional title
ownership, which involves similar automatic sharing of ownership rights and
responsibilities regarding the walls that separate the units.36
INTERFERENCE WITH POSSESSION
Amongst the entitlements of ownership is the entitlement to repel invaders.
When persons invade and take up occupation on another’s land, the right to
repel is governed to a great extent now by statutes,37 resulting in a limitation
of the right. The justification for the limitation flows from the constitutional
rights of both occupiers and owners, as well as the acknowledgement of the
socio-economic and political context.38 In a given situation, the facts
35 Ibid.
36 See Badenhorst et al op cit note 32 at 477; H J Delport South African Property
Practice and the Law 2 ed (2001) 99; D L Carey Miller & Anne Pope Land Title in South
Africa (2000) 219; C G van der Merwe Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing
(1995) vol 1 chaps 2 and 3.
37 For example, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation
of Land Act 19 of 1998, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999.
38 Property rights, like all other rights in the Bill of Rights, may be limited in
terms of s 36 of the Constitution.
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surrounding the unlawful occupation are analysed on a principled basis to
find a justifiable solution that satisfies the constitutional imperative. When a
builder invades another’s land, is the other’s right limited in a similarly
principled manner?
In Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, the right to resist such invasion
depended on the nature of the invasion, especially the origin of the invasion.
Thus, in Roman Law, where the invasion consisted of overhanging in so far
as it originated on the builder’s land and overhung the boundary to invade
the neighbour’s land, then the neighbour was not at liberty to remove the
invasion himself, but had to use the actio negatoria to force the builder to
concede that he had no servitude over the neighbour’s land and thus must
remove the overhanging thing. When, however, the invasion originated on
the neighbour’s land, he could remove the building himself because, on the
basis of accession, he was the owner of the offending building.39 In line with
the usual entitlements of ownership, he could use and enjoy his land
according to his own dictates, including remove that which he did not want.
In South African law, the position is stated to be that an owner may not act
himself to remove any invading building but must approach a court for
relief.40 According to Milton, the right of an owner ‘to demand removal
seems to be absolute for he is vindicating the freedom of his property from
unlawful interference’.41 Clearly, though, to permit the owner to demand
removal in every instance could lead to injustices and economic waste.
Hence, the court has a discretion42 to substitute an order for compensation in
appropriate situations, eg where the invasion is trivial and the cost of removal
is excessive. ‘The Court would be slow to order removal . . . if the justice of
the case could be met by an award of damages.’43 In Higher Mission School v
Grahamstown Town Council, although the finding (incorrectly) was that
removal had to be ordered, there being no discretion to award compensa-
tion, Van der Riet J specifically stated that in a case ‘where an extensive
building has been erected at great expense partly upon land of little value
belonging to a third party’, argument would be required before it is clear that
a court is ‘bound to order removal. . .even if it be established that the
encroachment was made in ignorance’.44
39 Voet 8.2.24; see Milton op cit note 30 at 236; also Smith v Basson 1979 (1) SA
559 (W) regarding implantatio: Plants that have originated elsewhere but have taken
root on the neighbour’s soil, can be removed by the neighbour.
40 See Milton op cit note 30 at 236 where UBS v Smookler’s Trustees supra note 26
at 627 is cited as authority; however, this case dealt not with encroachment but with
lien and the ius retentionis and thus with unjust enrichment.
41 Milton op cit note 30 at 241.
42 See Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) where Hattingh J traces the
existence of such a discretion.
43 Per Innes CJ in Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort 1918 AD 278 at 290.
44 1924 EDL 354 at 366. The case involved an encroachment by an electric power
plant.
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Clearly, an evaluation of the competing interests is required, including the
loss for both parties. The question therefore is when should compensation
for the neighbour or reallocation of ownership rights to the builder be the
appropriate remedy?
COMPENSATION OR REALLOCATION OF RIGHTS?
The Roman maxims superficies solo cedit45 and omne quod inaedificatio
solo cedit46 provide the foundations for the rules of inaedificatio according to
which reallocation of rights occurs.
Historically, the maxims were qualified in particular circumstances.
However, none of the sources is explicit about whether the circumstances
describe situations where the builder builds only partly on the land of the
neighbour, ie erects an encroachment, or builds wholly on the land of
another. The Twelve Tables rule awarded the builder double the value of his
timber built into the building of another by the actio de tigno, on the basis
that the builder retained ownership in his materials. This rule prevented the
unnecessary demolition of buildings in a particular context. In later Roman
law, whether the builder knew that he built on soil of another determined
the outcome. If he knew, he was taken to have parted voluntarily with his
materials, but if he built in ignorance, then he did not lose ownership in his
materials, on the basis that ‘no-one should gain profit to the detriment and
injury of another’.47 This attitude forms the basis for a claim in unjustified
enrichment. In Roman-Dutch law, a similar attitude is apparent, the bona
fide possessor being entitled to expenditure incurred in the building of the
improvements.
According to Bellingham v Bloommetje,48 the bona fide possessor is entitled
to compensation for useful expenses. No mention is made of ownership of
the materials, but impliedly the owner of the soil has undisputed ownership
thereof. In Barnard v Colonial Government,49 the court explains that where the
owner refuses to pay compensation on the ground that the ‘improvements
are so expensive that the owner would not have effected them himself’, then,
according to Voet, the builder can remove materials. He must do so without
injury to the land and claim compensation for the rest to the value ‘as the
materials would have been worth to him after the removal’. The basis for
suspension of the rules of accession appears to be a right of removal for the
builder, flowing from the maxim that condemns unjustified enrichment.50
According to De Vos,51 writing about unjustified enrichment, a distinc-
tion must be made between a bona fide possessor and an encroacher. The
45 Buildings form part of the land.
46 Everything built on the soil belongs to the soil.
47 D 50.17.206 as cited in UBS v Smookler’s Trustees supra note 26 at 627.
48 4 Buch 36.
49 5 Juta 122.
50 Ibid at 124–5.
51 Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg at 71 (cited in Milton op cit
note 30 at 244).
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latter is not treated in the same way as the former. In the absence of fault, the
encroacher is not liable for damage wrought to the land through building
works, but the owner without more is entitled to demand removal.52 This is
because the owner can reject the enrichment, whereas in the case of the bona
fide possessor (who builds wholly on the owner’s land), the owner cannot
insist on removal. De Vos does not explain the reason, but it must be that,
because the building works belong to him by accession, he must remove
them himself. Furthermore, in Christie v Haarhof, which involved a building
that ‘encroached to a considerable extent on plaintiff’s land’,53 the court
stated ‘there is no doubt that the plaintiff [neighbour] is legally entitled to
evict the defendant [builder] on payment of compensation for the value of
the buildings erected’.54 This dictum supports the view that the neighbour’s
entitlement flows from his ownership of the land that has been built on. That
the neighbour in Christie v Haarhof was willing to divest himself of ownership
of the land made for a satisfactory solution in that matter, but the basis on
which a court might so order was not explained. Were a court to issue such
an order, this would amount to an expropriation for the neighbour which
would raise other issues, not the least of which is that the power to
expropriate is reserved to the State.55 The value of this case as precedent for
the proposition that a court can order transfer against the will of the
neighbour is thus questionable. As is apparent from the preceding discussion,
the cases do not provide a clear picture of when compensation should be
favoured over reallocation of rights as the appropriate remedy. However, if,
as a preliminary step, the extent of encroachment is examined, then it will be
clearer when reallocation of rights or compensation is appropriate for the
particular circumstances.
TRIGGER FOR ENCROACHMENT RULES
It is evident that issues of compensation inform the qualifications to the
maxims governing accession, which, in the context of minor or insignificant
encroachment, makes sense. It allows the conflicting interests to be weighed
and assessed on the basis of reasonableness and fairness, which are prominent
principles in neighbour law.56 It is obvious that accession cannot provide a
satisfactory solution where one party has built partly on the land of another
52 It would appear that only minor or insignificant encroachment is under
consideration by De Vos, since he makes the point that, ‘on the basis of general
principle, compensation ought to be awarded [to the builder] when the landowner is
enriched by the attachment (which will seldom be the case) and does not insist on
removal’ (my translation); see Milton op cit note 30 at 244.
53 See Milton op cit note 30 at 243.
54 Christie v Haarhof supra note 33 at 353.
55 See, e g, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 63.
56 See François du Bois & Elspeth Reid ‘Nuisance’ in Zimmermann, Visser &
Reid op cit note 1 at 576–604; Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra note 42 at 133.
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and has a right of retention in the materials that suspends the effect of
accession. There has to be a determination of ownership of the building
works. In the case of a party wall, it is sensible to allocate the rights so that
each owner has an interest which includes both rights and duties. However,
when the building takes the form of a house, it is not sensible to share the
rights between different owners who have not intended to share ownership.
It is also not sensible to order removal where compensation and an
adjustment of rights would resolve the matter more satisfactorily.
Necessarily, the extent of encroachment must be factored into the
assessment of what is reasonable and fair in the particular situation. The
question to be answered is whether the rules of accession ought to be
suspended in the circumstances, allowing the exception of encroachment to
prevail. The extent of the encroachment is relevant, thus, to the determina-
tion of whether the matter is to be dealt with as an instance of accession or
encroachment, in the first instance. Secondly, if encroachment rules do
apply, whether the court ought to exercise its discretion to refuse the order
for removal in the circumstances must be determined. Thirdly, the extent of
encroachment is relevant to the determination of the measure of compensa-
tion to be awarded. The conflicting interests of the parties have to be
weighed and the impact of the (potential) loss to each assessed. The public
interest in avoiding economic waste is also relevant to the determination.
The older cases do not consistently mention the extent of the encroach-
ments at issue but frequently there are indications that they are of an
insignificant nature.57 The court in Brian Lackey Trust can see no reason for
limiting the exercise of discretion to situations involving only minor or
trivial encroachments. ‘Why’, it asks,
‘should the court have a discretion to order damages instead of demolition
where the eaves of a roof encroach by 111⁄2 inches; or where a 15-storey block
of flats encroaches by a ‘‘couple of inches’’; but not where it encroaches to a
considerable extent. . .?’58
A possible answer is that the alternatives are not confined to the two
outlined, namely an order for removal or compensation for the neighbour. If
the rules of accession take precedence, then the position is wholly different.
SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Reasonableness and fairness are acceptable principles in the assessment of the
conflicting interests involved to decide how the particular problem between
neighbours should be resolved. Thus it is understandable that where a trivial
encroachment is involved, the matter can be resolved by persuading the
neighbour to give up a portion of his land, subject to compensation. But
when the outcome is that the neighbour is to be deprived of the whole of his
57 See the cases cited by Milton op cit note 30 at 241–4.
58 Brian Lackey Trust supra note 7 para 29 (footnotes omitted).
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land, then, in accordance with the test in Wesbank, ‘a more compelling
purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law to
constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation’.59 In addition, the distinction
between a deprivation and an expropriation would have to be managed.60
What compelling purpose for deprivation is present in this instance? One
possibility is to foster neighbourliness. Another is to prevent economic
waste. Is either sufficiently compelling? Economic waste occurs on a daily
basis in the property market. Frequently people buy improved land and
immediately demolish the existing house to build a more luxurious one or at
least make extensive renovations. In similar vein, neighbours are notorious
for poor relationships, hence the need for neighbour law. Is the compelling
purpose in this case the view that the neighbour can be compensated in full
for his loss whereas the builder might be compensated only in part for his
error? This might be a fair and reasonable consideration. If the neighbour
were to reject the enrichment — which according to De Vos61 he may do —
then the builder would have no claim based on unjustified enrichment.
Evidence demonstrated that the parties, especially the neighbour, behaved
badly prior to the litigation, being less than co-operative and exchanging
various threats.62 The court’s view was that the neighbour’s stance in the
matter is based on
‘anachronistic concepts of ownership: it represents a rigid and dogmatic
insistence upon his perceived absolute rights as owner, irrespective of broader
considerations of social utility, economic waste and neighbourliness’.63
While, in principle, these considerations are obviously important, it is
unclear why in this situation ownership entitlements are affected so
profoundly by a wrong committed by another. The award of compensation
would mitigate the loss of the neighbour, but might do so only partly.
Disapproval was expressed of the fact that he was unwilling to negotiate a sale
based on the cost price of the plot. ‘[He] attempted to use his superior
bargaining position in an endeavour to extract from the [builder] a much
higher amount than he was entitled to.’64 But why should he not negotiate
to his advantage with the person who has effectively taken his land? In the
current property market boom, realization of (inflated) profits from the sale
of land, whether improved or not, is common. Why should he, without
clear justification, be deprived of this possibility? Neighbourliness implies a
relationship involving give and take, recognition of mutual responsibilities,
59 Wesbank supra note 11 para 100(e)–(f) quoted above in note 11.
60 Although beyond the scope of the topic here, this distinction is important for
the implications it has for compensation. In general terms, a deprivation of property
does not require compensation but expropriation does. See A J van der Walt
Constitutional Property Law (2005) chaps 4 and 5.
61 See note 52.
62 Brian Lackey Trust supra note 7 paras 6–15.
63 Ibid para 43.
64 Ibid para 41.
ENCROACHMENT OR ACCESSION? 553
etc. Did the builder act responsibly to ensure that the beacons demarcating
his property were located? Apparently not.
Fairness and equity in neighbour law have a normative content, according
to Rand Waterraad v Bothma.65
‘Where in a particular case, a neighbour’s entitlements flowing from his right in
respect of land in terms of established rules and principles, would or could lead
to great disadvantage of the other neighbour, fairness ensures that the former
neighbour bears part of the prejudice that the latter neighbour suffered or at
least would ensure that prejudice does not arise. Thus actual or potential
prejudice is evenly spread between the neighbours.’66
The principle of burden-sharing is evident elsewhere too.67 And in the
case of trivial encroachments, it makes good sense and the justification is
clear: the harmonization of relations between the neighbours on an
approximately win-win basis through use of the rules of encroachment.
Where the encroachment is extensive, on the other hand, the position is
different. The rules of accession should apply. Matters of reallocation of
rights and those of compensation ought not to be conflated.
In the case of accession, the builder’s remedy would be to claim only for
materials and labour expended in building. The proposition that the builder
should be protected because part of the building is on land belonging to him
seems absurd. Depending on the facts, the builder might also have a
concurrent claim for loss of possession of a portion of his land. For example,
assuming that the major part of the building is on the neighbour’s land, while
the lesser part is on the builder’s, the latter would have a claim for loss of
possession of the affected portion, which could be resolved using the rules of
encroachment. On the other hand, where approximately half of the building
stands on each plot,68 then finding a solution is made more complicated. The
court’s solution was to order the neighbour to alienate his (unimproved) land
at the then market value. On the face of it, this seems like a reasonable
solution, at least for the builder, but it fails to account for why the building
does not accede and for the validity of the forced sale. Unlike in Christie v
Haarhof,69 this neighbour was unwilling to divest himself of ownership. The
basis for taking his land against his will was not explained satisfactorily. The
neighbour could, of course, have chosen to sell his improved land to the
builder at market value, but then the builder must pay twice for the half of
the house built on the neighbour’s land, which does not accord easily with
notions of reasonableness and fairness. A third solution may be offered: there
were three virtually identical plots, two of which belonged to the builder and
the third to the neighbour. The court could have ordered a double transfer,
65 Rand Waterraad v Bothma supra note 42 at 125–30 per Hattingh J.
66 My translation. See also Botha v White 2004 (3) SA 184 (T), Dorland v Smits 2002
(5) SA 374 (C).
67 Mostert v Cape Town City Council 2001 (1) SA 105 (SCA).
68 As happened in this instance; see Brian Lackey Trust supra note 7 para 33.
69 See the text to note 54.
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assuming for the sake of discussion that such an order is open to the court. In
other words, the court could have ordered the parties to swap their plots as
the most reasonable and fair way to resolve the difficult practical problem.
That way each would have been similarly deprived but also similarly
benefited, which, in the circumstances, seems fair.
CONCLUSION
It goes against the grain that, in this case, it seems to have been assumed that
the neighbour must suffer the deprivation, largely because very expensive
building works had been erected. This assumption points to an emphasis on
the rights of only one party, which is constitutionally unsound.70 The rights
of both parties must be fully considered. The maxim guarding against
unjustified enrichment should apply to both. The court seems to take the
view that only the neighbour could be enriched unjustifiably by the builder’s
error. But the solution adopted seems to enrich the builder, especially if the
neighbour is permitted only the cost price of the land and a solatium as
compensation. Given that building was at the heart of the matter, the focus of
attention ought to have been the relationship between the building works
and the land. The court’s analysis does not consider all the complexities of
the matter, including the implications of a forced sale, and thus does not
make apparent a sufficient reason for depriving the neighbour of his land,
which points to an arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of s 25(1) of
the Constitution. The potential for future mischief by building over the
boundary line in pursuit of acquisition of the neighbour’s land is alarming.
Deeper analysis may show, however, that for reasons of reasonableness,
fairness and equity, the compelling purpose for depriving the neighbour does
exist; nevertheless, without such analysis, this is not obvious.
The importance of maintaining the integrity of the principle-driven
structure of property law cannot be overemphasized. Without such integrity,
the system of landownership in South Africa would become chaotic and
unsustainable in practical terms. Where departure from structure is necessary
for policy reasons, this should be properly justified. In principle, compensa-
tion grounded in unjustified enrichment is available to a builder who builds
partly on the land of another. The neighbour is entitled to demand removal.
Whether removal should be supported depends on the extent of the
encroachment. The court has discretion to suspend accession where the
encroachment is insignificant because, on grounds of reasonableness and
fairness, as well as in the interest of avoiding unnecessary economic waste,
the more satisfactory solution to the problem may be to compensate the
neighbour and to reallocate the rights in the land, assuming the neighbour’s
willingness to co-operate. Where the encroachment is extensive or
70 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 43; President of the Republic of
South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 33; Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1)
SA 580 (CC).
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significant, then more compelling reasons must justify the deprivation of the
neighbour’s property. The difference between a trivial and a significant
encroachment is a factual matter which must be determined on the specific
facts of each case. Necessarily, therefore, the extent of the encroachment is
an important factor in the determination of what is a reasonable, fair and
equitable solution in a given context.
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